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PANEL II: DISCUSSION
TRANSCRIPT
DAN SHAVIRO: First of all, just to spring to the defense
of my economist friends here, if only lawyers know about fair-
ness, why aren't there more economist jokes than there are
lawyer jokes? But anyway, for the few friends I have in the
room, I thought I would say that for them.
A couple of comments on the paper. What's the differ-
ence between a shark and an economist? You know you never
hear that joke. Well, maybe we can work on that one and come
up with a punch line tomorrow. Anyway, one thing in
Michael's paper that baffled me a little bit, and I have said
this to him before in another setting, I would agree that obvi-
ously, capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality
don't sum. up to the total of relative considerations. There
seems to be a kind of empirical claim that it is really screwing
things up. I know that if you read joint committee studies, and
maybe in some of the United Treasury studies it comes up in
the introduction, they talk about it. But one doesn't really see
it in the political sector. The problem is Archer, or if the Demo-
crats get back-the House, Rangel. These guys are too much im-
pressed by capital export neutrality or capital import neutrali-
ty. I don't quite see how these concepts, or the focus on these
concepts, is responsible for actual problems in the rules that
emerge. If you think about the sort of sophisticated academic
economist-and Jack Mintz said that he doesn't really focus on
these things as a dominant part of his research, and that's the
experience I have had in talking to other international tax
accountants as well. So, I think its a basic vital contribution,
but in pointing out the multiplicity of concerns but I'm not
sure why CEN or CIN have this role. In Peggy's work, they
obviously do, but why are they being blamed in some way for
the impasses that we face?
About equity, in the international setting, I think Larry is
descriptively right-that this sort of CEN tracks very nicely
with horizontal equity, defined in a certain way. I don't think
horizontal equity is a very useful idea here, and even apart
from the fundamental, there have been a lot of law professors
writing articles about whether, as a normative matter, we
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should be worrying about horizontal equity-whether it is
sufficiently well-grounded, and so forth. But, simply the point
that Boris Bicker made a long time ago about taxed capitaliza-
tion seems to be pretty significant here. If some U.S. individu-
als are investing in 20 percent tax countries, and we have an
exempt system, and others are investing in 50 percent tax
countries, one would think that the opportunity in world capi-
tal markets returns would kind of be completed down to
completable levels. So, even if you have horizontal equity as
having some normalitive weight, its hard to see how it really
plays out here, and it is an important concern. That, of course,
is Bicker's famous comment that equity problems turn into
efficiency problems.
Vertical equity, that certainly is... you can think of it in
a lot of ways--distribution, richer v. poorer-that obviously is
a very important issue. I think, and maybe this is actually in
support of Michael's saying that things have changed since
1963, and we have to rethink it. If you think of a large closed
economy verses a small open economy, you might say that we
have a lot of capital income in the U.S.; a lot of investment in
the U.S. and you are either very large as compared to the
world economy, or there is not very much capital flow across
borders. You might say, well there is a little bit of this stuff
that goes abroad. Does that really pose a vertical equity issue
in terms of the overall tax being borne by wealthy people? And
the analogy you might come up with is, to what extent do we
have to think about vertical equity, when we are deciding what
the depreciation rules for equipment should be? The answer is
not very much. True, it will affect, to some extent, the overall
taxation of business investment, but that is sort of going to be
trivial and dwarfed by the inner asset effects on investment
that it will have. Now once you start to get a very large portion
of the investment sector, then it is very different.
So, if foreign investment is relatively a small piece, you
might say, really how we tax is just going to affect inner as-
sets-U.S. verses foreign investment choices. Its not really a
big distribution issue. Its not really going to affect the overall
tax rate people are facing very much.
U.S. economy is, in a sense, smaller because the rest of the
world's economy have grown so much. More importantly, once
it's more open, you have more capital flowing back and forth,
and it certainly becomes true that you invest abroad, and you
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don't pay any tax anywhere. If that's the norm we get to, then
it's certainly true that it becomes a distribution issue, not just
an efficiency issue, because now its really affecting an overall
rate of return that a class of people are getting, because its a
large enough piece of the pie. So, I think that's kind of the
change that maybe makes vertical equity more of a picture
here than it was before.
I guess I have one other, small thing on horizontal equity.
Again, you have heard me say this before: I do have a hard
time with horizontal equity as between corporations. I know
you're familiar with all the arguments, but again, I own 100
percent of two corporations, and when the U.S. Government
decides to tax one more than the other, it doesn't sound---even
if we didn't have taxed capitalization-like a very strong
normalative concern that my left hand and my right hand are
sort of being taxed at different rates, when they are both me.
Of course, when corporations have different owners, then we
once again have to go through the individuals. So, I am not
sure why you have that concern in there, when I know you are
quite familiar with the arguments against it.
A final point, just to sort of take half of each side in some
of the discussion we have been having. A familiar point to
many people in the room, but just in case not everyone, that
Joe Slemrod wrote up recently is that, while free trade is, un-
der some assumptions, worth pursuing, whether others recipro-
cate or not, there is a difference here. And I think Mike is
quite right to point that promoting world-wide efficiency
through foreign tax credits, for example, without, is not as
automatically, particularly in our interests. The example could
be, if we really want to promote world-wide efficiency, that if
Singapore has a higher tax on champagne than on beer, we
should run over to Singapore and give the beer manufacturers
some money to equalize it. Obviously not, so there is a differ-
ence in the two. I do tend to think that the difference isn't that
great, because, as David Hariton said, there is a strong ele-
ment . .. a consent of what we do will be reciprocated. But
Mike's quite right to point out that it is not exactly the same,
because it is not ambiguously in our advantage without reci-
procity.
LEO RASKIND: Let's see I have John Steines, and Gary,
and Jack. Thank you.
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JOHN STEINES: I know martini's are dancing before the
eyes of many people, so I promise to keep this under sixty
seconds. I just want to follow up, very briefly, on what Larry
said, because I think its a decent transition to David's
[Rosenbloom] paper tomorrow. I take the main point of Mike's
[Graetz] paper to be, simply, that global efficiency is on the
menu of things to consider, but it doesn't always have to be the
main course. Sometimes it's consistent with being fair; some-
times it's consistent with being simple; and sometimes its not.
If you don't wear it as a yoke, I guess you can consider things
such as exemption systems, which are somewhat heretical to
export neutrality. I guess you could consider things like giving
people only deductions for foreign taxes, instead of credits,
because maybe you think its simpler, or maybe you think the
tax on portfolio income is not quite as legitimate as the tax on
direct investment, I'm not sure, but at least it lets you think
about it that way.
The one problem I have, and we will take it up tomor-
row-I don't want to poach on tomorrow's time-I think if
we're going to give credits for some foreign taxes and deduc-
tions for others, whether the split is between portfolio versus
direct, or direct in an A-team country as opposed to a B-team
country, it's incumbent on us to figure out why. I've yet to hear
the reason why, but we'll leave that for tomorrow morning.
LEO RASKIND: Gary?
GARY HUFBAUER: Three points. Firstly, Peggy
Musgrave enunciated a view which has even been endorsed by
Jack and a few others: that there's a strong case for free trade,
but the case for international investment is much weaker.
There are big question marks about it, and on that I would
make two submissions. One, the empirical research on free
trade substantially demonstrating the benefits as opposed to a
theoretical analysis. The reading is only about fifteen years old
and it is extremely persuasive, and that same kind of empirical
research is now being done on investment, and is coming up
with similarly very persuasive benefit calculations. Secondly, if
you go along with that idea that free trade is good, but direct
investment has attached to it big question marks, from your
stand point the train has left the station long ago, because the
amount of production associated with investment is now much
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larger and is growing much faster than trade. And so, it's too
late or you better get on a campaign of really trying to stop
this awful animal because its growing very fast. However, I
think its just a great animal.
My third point is the commonly said-and David Hariton
repeated it-notion that the reason we don't do a national neu-
trality-type of taxation is because we're afraid of the copycat
effect. I suggest that's just nonsense. The reason why we don't
do national neutrality is that it would be very bad for us. If the
copycat effect were as important as the reason for not having
this kind of dreadful-as what I regard as dreadful--direct in-
vestment type of tax system, then you'd see Switzerland and
the Netherlands having national neutrality systems. After all,
who is going to copycat either of those countries? They are very
small, they are very rich, and they do a lot of outward invest-
ment. So, I think the copycat is just over-exaggerated, and
what Michael said about Adams, way back when we were so
generous to everybody, well, we were basically generous to our-
selves. We may not have known it then, but that's how it
turned out. It wasn't that we were so generous to the world
with this system.
So, just maybe one final point, and I think this just under-
scores some of the things Michael said on this whole CEN de-
bate-and I agree with him. The U.S. position now is so re-
versed from when that debate took place. Our inward net in-
vestment is about two trillion. We have about five trillion
abroad, these are books: seven trillion coming in, and probably
that debate is so phrased in terms of the U.S. being the big
capital exporter to the world, while it hasn't been so in ten
years.
LEO RASKIND: Would you go to the microphone and state
your name, for the tape being made, and then we will get your
comments.
TANYA BENDER: Thank you. My name is Tanya Bender.
I am a lecturer at Leiden University and also a tax lawyer at
Loyeus & Loof, which is a Dutch law firm. The points that I'm
missing so far is the distinction between active and passive;
especially, as most of you probably know, the Netherlands is a
typical exemption country, and we consider exemptions the
prime method for avoidance of double taxation, and the deduc-
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tion of foreign tax, which is, in fact, I am a little bit surprised
to hear it, and also to have read it in Peggy Musgrave's paper.
A sort of reasonable option, here we consider it an option
whereby from whatever point of view you look at it, there is
double taxation. And the distinction we use is that between
active and passive investment, and to steal the comparison
that Professor Kaufman made, that the guy on main street
who is looking at his neighbor who has the same income and is
taxed higher, or lower in a foreign country, and what he would
or would not understand. I think he would understand that the
tax rates, the tax pressure, was determined by the foreign
country if it was active income, business income, active busi-
ness income. He would not, if it would be a saving, savings
accounts, in a Main Street bank or foreign bank. And I'm hap-
py to hear from Professor Graetz that he considers that exemp-
tion for some situations the right method, but then only the
situations in which the foreign tax rate is 75 percent or more
of the U.S. tax rate. Do I understand you correctly?
MICHAEL GRAETZ: Yes, and it was only for active in-
come.
TANYA BENDER: Okay, that's just what I wanted to say.
MICHAEL GRAETZ: The paper makes it clear that it is
only active business income.
TANYA BENDER: Okay, and then there would be of
course, a lot of issues about rates, as opposed to basis, because
it would be very easy for a foreign country to have relatively
high rates, that's a very small basis.
JACK MINTZ: May I make a very brief comment?
TANYA BENDER: No, go ahead.
JACK MINTZ: I would like to make one very brief com-
ment about the specific proposal of Michael's. We have an
exemption system in Canada for active business income, simi-
lar, although yours is actually more general than ours on the
sources of income. We looked at the idea of actually having an
exemption only for high tax countries. Now, you have kind of
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let the cat out of the bag, Michael, when you said you don't
like cross crediting. But, effectively, an exemption system, only
for high tax countries, effectively what you're doing is you're
disallowing the cross crediting. [Interposing] Maybe that's
something you want to do... [Interposing].
AUDIENCE MEMBERS: That's right.
JACK MINTZ: But it is certainly not as generous as a
more general exemption system for active business income, and
I would also suggest to you that there is absolutely no simplifi-
cation at all, with your proposal, because you're still going to
have to go through all of the calculations of surplus pots and
everything else.
MICHAEL GRAETZ (discussing David Bradford's paper
from Panel II): This is not a tax that I've ever embraced and
therefore refuse to accept David's invitation to spend the rest
of my life thinking about all the problems, and solving all the
problems with it, but let me explain why, and that is that I
think that if the U.S. ever went to, and I have to say this is a
big problem with my favorite business tax which is the Ceber
proposal that Treasury proposed which is an income tax on
businesses, not a consumption tax on businesses, but this prob-
lem is the same I'm afraid. And that is if the U.S. went to a
situation where individuals are only taxing wages at the indi-
vidual level, it's very hard for me to imagine that lasting very
long. Now part of that is because I sat in the Congress in the
Ways and Means Committee for months in 1969 when the
committee tried to figure out how to tax Mrs. Dodge. Mrs.
Dodge of the Chrysler origins had a million dollars in tax ex-
empt interest and paid no tax and that exercise produced for
us the entire minimum tax system that we now have and ev-
erybody can agree you know we have two income taxes, if you
don't like this regular income tax you must really hate the
other one, right?
Because we've got two, David, and so if you imagine not
Mrs. Dodge, but just a whole host of people who are collecting
interest, dividends and capital gains and no wages, with a lot
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of income, how quickly will it be before Congress at least does
what's done in some of these European countries and enacts
some schedule or low rate tax on them to begin financing gov-
ernment. Once that happens if you don't tax financial flows at
the corporate level, the corporation becomes a shelter for that
tax, whatever it is and you're in the suit, and so I mean you
know an idea of that a value added tax of whatever sort but
the normal sort, the flat tax sort, or the X tax sort is simpler
than the income tax is not surprising. You know of course it's
simpler when you go to emerging countries you don't tell them
to start with the income tax, you tell them to start with a
value added tax and so it's not surprising that it's simpler. I
just don't believe it to be politically worthwhile, you know?
This is not to say that it's not worth spending your life on.
So...
VICTOR THURONYI: Ever generous, ever generous
LEO RASKIND: Victor?
VICTOR THURONYI: I've always thought I won't com-
ment on this proposal because I haven't completely studied it,
but one of the things that I find a little bit surprising in the
presentation and the papers is that I always thought that one
of the biggest problems with moving to any kind of a consump-
tion tax in replacement of the income tax is the transition
problem. You have existing stocks of tax paid wealth, existing
housing stock and other consumer durables, so I think that
these proponents of that sort of a change really need to focus
there because I think some of the most serious problems are
likely to be found there and I think that as a political matter
it's very difficult to make such a change.
REUVEN AVI-YONAH: I guess I just want to echo what
some other people have said. David is famous for turning our
attention to the transition problem in the move from the in-
come tax to the consumption tax. I mean that he has always
said that without attention to transition, you can't possibly do
anything, yet it seems to me that this paper kind of makes the
jump, it doesn't say what is a transition problem international-
ly, which is this problem that has been referred to by Peggy
Musgrave and Larry Lokken-namely, the fact that if we do
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this unilaterally we will have to be the only country in the
world that has VAT, and everybody else has an income tax and
what do you do about that. And there's obviously and maybe
everybody else will adopt the X tax, but that will be a process
that will take a long time and it will have some complicating
effects and I think people have written about it. Davis
Westbrook has one view, published another view, and other
people have had their own views, but I don't think you can
address an issue without writing about it. I don't think you can
just leave that question out.
LEO RASKIND: Thank you. Yes, Jack.
JACK MINTZ: David handled all the responses to people
getting worried about the consumption tax. Let me just raise
kind of three issues that are related to your paper. First of all,
on your question of the origin versus the destination basis,
there is a question of economic grants. The two are not equiva-
lent, at least in my view. I don't think they are equivalent in
terms of taxation of economic grants but basically there is a
good argument for moving to consumption tax in the sense
that you would be able to tax economic grants reflected in the
price of goods no matter where those economic grants are
earned in the world because you're basically taxing the con-
sumption of those economic grants and, on the other hand, an
origin based tax would tax the economic grants within the
jurisdiction. And those two things aren't necessarily the same
in terms of the impact for each jurisdiction.
On the other hand, I would argue that in today's world,
where economic grants are moving from what I would call
origin based economic grants, in other words they're not as
large, nor as important, as maybe knowledge-based assets
within firms that makes maybe a stronger argument for coun-
tries switching over to consumption taxes in order to get some
of the tax, some of the economic grants that are earned in the
world.
The second point I want to raise is, I'm actually a bit sur-
prised you're putting so much emphasis on the tourism. I mean
one of the things we can learn is value added tax throughout
the world and what issues are important. Tourism is an issue,
but to me it serves second order compared to some of the other
things. I mean, the electronic commerce this year is becoming
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important, but I don't think tourism is really the one that wor-
ries me. In terms of value added taxes I think the more impor-
tant issues are often where the border problems arise. For
example, the treatment of financial services versus non-finan-
cial activities, you know financial, most value added tax sys-
tems will exempt financial services and of course that leads to
all sorts of issues in terms of drawing the border there. Under
your X tax I would presume that you're not going to have a tax
on banks because most of their income is financial, at least I'm
not quite sure how you're handling financial institutions in
your X tax proposal but I think that is an issue.
And then there's the question of non-profits in many coun-
tries and I would presume that's an important issue in the
United States. Again, that creates border problems and they
have to be dealt with in your kind of system. And I should
mention that in Canada we went through basically a whole
debate whether we should have a business transfer tax which
is kind of a version of the X tax which is an accounts basis
system versus moving to the value added tax. In the end we
elected to go to the value added tax precisely because of all
these border problems, and border issues. For example, it's not
a matter of not allowing for the deduction of imports, but let's
say if you buy goods or services from a non-profit and there's
no tax on a non-profit then you have to disallow the deduction
for the non-profit then you start having to keep track of the
various transactions and you're soon into an input invoice
system as a result. In fact, that's been the Japanese experi-
ence. They started with an accounts basis Japanese consump-
tion tax and then they soon had to keep track of all the invoic-
es, so they start moving into an invoice credit system under
their accounts basis system, so that kind of gives me a ques-
tion about why not just have a value added tax, there's lots of
experience and why start with a completely different system.
And finally there's two interesting things I'd be interested
in and maybe Philip West knows the answer to this. Recently
there's a couple of countries that have been moving to the
British ACE system where they're basically given an imputed
deduction for equity and effectively it becomes equivalent to a
cash flow tax. One of them is Italy, and also Italy's region tax
is an origin based value added tax and the interesting thing is
that the United States is given a foreign tax credit for the
income portion of the IRAP in Italy at the regional level, which
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is the way the tax is calculated basically-the accounts basis
revenue minus no deduction for payroll, no deduction for inter-
est, but there is a deduction for depreciation of capital, not
expense on the capital. It's the depreciation based on the corpo-
rate income tax rules. But there is a, part of that is given for-
eign tax credit. But the corporate level, the Italian system is
now giving an imputed deduction for equity on new equity fi-
nancing and I understand that's still getting a foreign tax
credit which is kind of fascinating.
And then the other country that is very akin to your sys-
tem is Croatia. Croatia has kind of the S based type of corpo-
rate income tax, very interesting system. It is really a rent tax
on an origin basis. Interest dividends are exempt and capital
gains exempt at the individual level, so it's just wages that are
subject to tax. So Croatians have the system and it is my un-
derstanding that the U.S. gives them a foreign tax credit for it.
So I would be kind of interested in seeing what is the policy in
the United States because I don't understand it any more.
LEO RASKIND: We have about six minutes left. I'll split
them between Philip West and Stanford Ross.
PHILIP WEST: I'll be very brief. Just to respond to Jack
on the IRAP-the Italian regional tax-the economists in Trea-
sury, and I'm not an expert in the area, but the economists in
Treasury, I believe, rely on the depreciation deductions to dis-
tinguish the IRAP from the typical consumption tax and they
cast it more as an income tax than a consumption tax and on
that basis, you referred to it as a VAT yesterday, if that's accu-
rate.
JACK MINTZ: There is a VAT on an income basis, there is
a VAT on a consumption basis. There is an income basis VAT.
PHILIP WEST: I was going to say if it is indeed a con-
sumption tax, we've got a problem because part of the reason
that the congressional staffs have gotten comfortable with us
granting credit and treaty is on the basis that it is an income
base tax, and I believe, again, that's because of the deduction
for depreciation. The only narrow point for David on the illu-
sive inter-nation equity question, the point made in your pa-
per, is that it seemed to you that inter-nation equity would be
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assured under an origin based X tax because the country's
claim to revenue associated with income produced within its
borders would be satisfied. But again, I harken back to the
example of China and India. If markets are viewed as a legiti-
mate basis on which to claim tax jurisdiction, I query whether
an origin based-if every country went to an origin based X
tax-whether that would satisfy this concept of inter-nation
equity, if the existence of markets in a country is a legitimate
basis on which to claim tax jurisdiction.
STANFORD ROSS: It's really a question for David Brad-
ford that I don't know the answer to, but I wondered what his
thinking was-and that is employment taxes really say they're
roughly 30% across the OECD-I assume that your system just
leaves all of that out because finances, pensions, and health
care are sort of interwoven systems, and you're just replacing
the general revenue taxes.
What about the incidences, though, of having all of this
tax on consumption piled on top of this: 30% of employment
taxes. There's something pragmatic about having a diversity of
tax bases in terms of political acceptability. Just a pragmatic
thought, and I think the one reason I'm really happy to be here
is I'm learning a lot, but I also think that all of you who are
really interested in looking at these problems holistically have
to take account of, not only the size of the employment taxes,
but, in most countries, they may double in the next 50 to 75
years. So if your 28% rate is so, and in the U.S., for example,
you wind up with a 25 or 30% social security tax, I don't know.
Does that seem like it's a good system? And in Michael's case
yesterday, his great simplification of dropping all these individ-
uals out-if there still needs to be what's held on for the social
security taxes, and you start to introduce income tax like as-
pects in like Michael proposed in one article, how much sim-
plification do you have? I'm just sort of asking questions about
whether are you looking at this whole subject holistically
enough from the standpoint of what's really going to be out
there?
LEO RASKIND: David, at last you get to respond.
DAVID BRADFORD: What do you want to do Victor?
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VICTOR ZONANA: Three minutes, and counting.
DAVID BRADFORD: Well a lot of great questions. I have
a lot of answers, but not in three minutes. But I guess I'll start
at the end with Stan. My broad cut is all taxes can basically
fall on earnings and I think that's where they all fall on; so
they all add up-almost all of them-add up to be taxes on
earnings. So whatever the label may be, they're going to end
up falling on earnings, so let me just leave it at that. We can
push the point, thinking about detail so whatever you label it
as, the incident is ultimately on earnings, in my view. Let me
just leave it at that.
And I didn't understand Phil's question about inter-nation
equity, and I don't understand the context to begin with, so let
me duck that.
I was very interested in Jack's comments about the Italian
system, and the Croatian system is indeed very close to what
I've got in mind. Maybe I should make a bigger deal about
that. I don't know any details and it may be full of quirkiness
that I don't know about, but it's right on and I'm very inter-
ested that we credit it. That's great.
A lot of questions are not addressed in the paper and that
I have, in many cases, addressed elsewhere. For example, Jack
asked how am I going to think about financial institutions. I'll
cite my own papers. I wrote a paper about how I think you
should think about the taxation of financial institutions and
it's published, and I'll send anyone the cite. I think those same
ideas would carry over in the international context but I have-
n't thought that through.
I don't agree Jack-and this is a straight economics ques-
tion that we should have a side bar on-that origin and desti-
nation systems, in principle, treat economic grants differently.
I think they treat them the same, but I just don't agree with
that.
Reuven, I didn't understand. Maybe you missed my
comment about transition. I think transition is terribly impor-
tant. I think step one is to decide whether the target is worth
making a transition to. That's how I thought about this paper.
It takes many books, of course, to get all these details worked
through, but many of these things I've written and thought
about quite a bit. Not much about this international sense, but
the general problem of transition. Victor, this goes to you. I've
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got to give you a couple of papers to read because I've thought
a lot about transition.
All I'm saying is let's go one step at a time. I didn't try to
do everything in this paper: that's my only excuse. I think it's
very important.
Larry, I really appreciate those helpful comments and
thank you for pushing them in the direction that I think was
more on the theme that rm trying to push in this paper. Hav-
ing said that, it would be intriguing to think about what would
happen if we went unilaterally to an X tax. What about the
politics? What would happen, what would flow, etcetera. How
about those financial transactions. I haven't thought them
through it. It would seem interesting to think it through. I
think those would be serious and important issues. That's all I
can say. I don't disagree with that. Although, again you re-
mark many countries put in a 15% VAT somewhere along the
way and somehow the world didn't end. They must have cut
something else and are not doing those VATs. In other words,
these kinds of transitions both can be made and have been
made, and don't upset the whole world. The definition of
business' permanent status-I love that question. I don't know
the answer, and rd like to think all those details through. I
have written about it, by the way, in a comment and I'm sorry
Vito didn't seem to know the paper. Charlie McClure did a
paper for the Tax Law Review on taxing e-commerce, and I
wrote a comment, of course, on it. It's in the Tax Law Review:
about my thinking about how we would address these precise-
ly, of course. I answered the question how to do it in this type
of tax.
Many of the issues are the same in an income tax. I mean
it's a matter of monitoring transactions-it's not that easy to
do and you have to think it through but again, the fact that
the timing is less important I think can be quite a bit of help.
Oh Larry, the other point-that you need a negative tax.
Yes, I think you do. By the way, this is the same in an income
tax. I think we basically agree on income tax conceptually and
certainly think the business tax should be at a flat rate. It
should be that you should get a deduction for losses and an
inclusion for gains. That's conceptually right, but there are
practical reasons that we don't allow that. There are sort of
enforcement issues and you have to put some limit on vast
cheating. If you can't, then the whole treasury is back into
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refund and it's political things going to Michael Graetz' plan.
What can I say: if the politicians can't handle this, they can't
handle it and that's an important thing to take into account in
your design. It's hard for me to think that the existing system
would really stack up and is worth it all, but maybe it would.
Or maybe we're just going to end up with the existing system
anyway because that's the only thing politicians can do.
Il come back, and I'll finish on this, Victor, that to the
extent my arguments are really taken on board, and I may be
wrong, but I think if they're really taken on board, a lot of
those "political problems" can really help a lot: when it be-
comes doctrine, a joint tax or at treasury tax in a policy, when
it becomes doctrine-that this is the right way to think about
things, a lot of things start changing happening, politically,
and this discussion of the crediting the foreign tax is a great
example. Is it okay with joint tax? Not to politicians. They
don't know anything about it. The joint tax committee is really
an intellectual issue, I think, and if we were to decide-intel-
lectually, obviously we're not there-if we were to agree that
this is the right thing to do, I think a lot of the political prob-
lems would be very, very different.
VICTOR ZONANA: Thank you David. Thank you Leo. It's
clear that we have revisited the theory of international income
taxation. We have solved all of the problems and we're ready
now to turn to the next panel, which is going to address the
issue of U.S. multinationals and the questions of competitive-
ness.
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